# Tin: Criticality

A conflict mineral that needs supply-chain checks

Source page: https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/criticality/

What this tab covers How exposed economies are to a supply disruption: the EU, US and India listings, the concentration score, and a quantified exposure for the US, EU, India, China, Japan, Latin America, the Middle East and Australia. Where the EU scored it, a chart of supply risk against economic importance, with import reliance, recycling input and substitutes.

#### Exposure by region

| Region | Exposure | Share of world output | Share of world imports | Share of world exports | Net trade (US$) | On own critical list | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **US** | High | 0.0% | 13.8% | 2.1% | −$673.2 m | Yes | No mining since 1993 or smelting since 1989; 77% net import reliance in 2025, the largest importer with 13.8% of world refined imports in 2024, and tin is on the 2025 US critical minerals list (USGS; UN Comtrade). |
| **EU** | High | 0.0% | 27.0% | 16.1% | −$598.9 m | No | Germany took 7.4% of refined imports and Belgium exported 5.3% (recycled tin) in 2024; tin is not on the EU critical list (supply risk 0.9) but EU end-of-life recycling input is 31% (EU CRM 2023; UN Comtrade). |
| **India** | High | 0.0% | 7.1% | 0.2% | −$395.9 m | Yes | Net importer of about 12,100 t a year (2023), almost all from Indonesia, with 7.1% of world refined imports in 2024; tin is on India's 2023 critical minerals list and import duties were removed in 2024 (ITA; UN Comtrade). |
| **China** | Medium | 25.4% | 12.7% | 9.1% | −$192.2 m | Yes | Largest miner (71,000 t, 2025) and refiner (194,000 t refined, 2024), but also the second-largest importer with 12.7% of refined imports and a large importer of concentrate (USGS; ITA; UN Comtrade). |
| **Japan** | High | 0.0% | 9.9% | 0.6% | −$537.8 m | No | No mine output; imports 9.9% of world refined tin (2024) for its electronics and chemicals industries (UN Comtrade). |
| **Latin America** | Low | 24.9% | 1.8% | 29.5% | +$1.65 bn | no list | Peru (33,000 t), Brazil (28,000 t) and Bolivia (15,000 t) mined about a quarter of world tin in 2025, and Peru and Bolivia together exported 24% of refined tin by value in 2024 (USGS; UN Comtrade). |
| **Middle East** | Low | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.0% | −$7.99 m | no list | No Middle Eastern country appears among tin producers or the top six importers or exporters (USGS 2026; UN Comtrade 2024). |
| **Australia** | Low | 4.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | −$6.31 m | No | Mined about 12,000 t in 2025, mostly at Renison in Tasmania, with reserves of 570,000 t (USGS). |

 Exposure rating: **High** when the region is a net importer whose import share is at least three times its share of world output (or, for farm goods, it produces under 70% of what it consumes); **Medium** for other net importers (or 70-95% self-sufficiency), raised to High when world supply is highly concentrated in another country; **Low** for net exporters or self-sufficient regions. Net importer status uses tonnage where reported, otherwise value. Output: World Mining Data, 2024. Trade: UN Comtrade 2024 (EU = sum of member states, including intra-EU trade). Critical lists: US 2025, EU 2024/1252, India 2023, China 2016 strategic minerals, Japan METI, Australia 2024.

Tin is on the US 2025 list and India's 2023 list, but the EU does not class it as critical. The EU scores supply risk at 0.9 and economic importance at 4.5, with 73% import reliance for refined metal. Tin is one of the EU's regulated conflict minerals, which require supply-chain checks because armed groups have traded it (Pitron). Substitutes exist for cans, such as aluminium, glass and plastics, but solder has fewer. The US is trying to rebuild a domestic supply chain: a Virginia plant is due by late 2026.
 EU 2023 Not critical US 2025 list Yes India 2023 list Yes Production HHI 1,349 unconcentrated

#### EU 2023 assessment

Chart: EU 2023 criticality: supply risk against economic importance
 Each dot is a material assessed by the EU in 2023. The shaded corner is the critical zone (supply risk ≥ 1.0, economic importance ≥ 2.8). Tin: supply risk 0.9, economic importance 4.5. EU import reliance, extraction 0% EU import reliance, processing 73% EU recycling input rate 31% US net import reliance, 2025 77% share of apparent consumption

#### Substitutes

Aluminium, glass, paper, plastic or tin-free steel in cans; epoxy resins for solder; aluminium and copper alloys and plastics for bronze and bearings

## Other sections

- [Summary](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/index.md)
- [Overview](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/overview/index.md)
- [Correlation](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/correlation/index.md)
- [Extraction](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/extraction/index.md)
- [Production](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/production/index.md)
- [Stocks](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/stocks/index.md)
- [Cycles](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/cycles/index.md)
- [Trading](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/trading/index.md)
- [Movement](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/movement/index.md)
- [Characteristics](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/characteristics/index.md)
- [Emissions](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/emissions/index.md)
- [Relationships](https://www.materialinsights.org/commodities/tin/links/index.md)