# Cyber weapons: Materials

Source page: https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-materials/

#### Critical materials

The materials whose supply could hold it back

- No material constrains cyber weapons: they are software, and copying them costs almost nothing ^[2].
- The policy fact is export control: in December 2013 the Wassenaar Arrangement added controls on intrusion software and IP network surveillance systems ^[5].
- The UN Group of Governmental Experts' 2015 norms ask states not to support ICT activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure ^[6].

as of 2026-11-11

#### Sources

1. [The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability (R41524)](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41524.html) Congressional Research Service, via EveryCRSReport, 2010
2. [Internet Freedom and Export Controls (Tim Maurer)](https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2016/03/internet-freedom-and-export-controls?lang=en) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016
3. [Open Consultation on UN GGE 2015 Norm Proposals](https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-projects/governance-and-global-affairs/public-consultation-on-un-gge-2015-norm-proposals) Leiden University

## Other sections

- [Summary](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/index.md)
- [Overview](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-overview/index.md)
- [Science](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-science/index.md)
- [Evolution](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-evolution/index.md)
- [Energy footprint](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-energy-footprint/index.md)
- [Industries](https://www.materialinsights.org/technologies/cyber_weapons/tech-industries/index.md)
