Silicon: Criticality
The risk lies in processing, not in geology
What this tab covers How exposed economies are to a supply disruption: the EU, US and India listings, the concentration score, and a quantified exposure for the US, EU, India, China, Japan, Latin America, the Middle East and Australia. Where the EU scored it, a chart of supply risk against economic importance, with import reliance, recycling input and substitutes.Exposure by region
| Region | Exposure | Share of world output | Share of world imports | Share of world exports | Net trade (US$) | On own critical list | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | High | – | 11.7% | 0.6% | −$717.7 m | Yes | Five plants make ferrosilicon and silicon metal, but net import reliance for silicon metal rose above 50% in 2025 and silicon was added to the US critical list in November 2025; anti-dumping duties apply to ferrosilicon from Brazil, Kazakhstan and Malaysia (USGS). |
| EU | High | – | 28.7% | 15.6% | −$926.7 m | Yes | France, Spain and Slovakia process about 5% of world silicon metal, and silicon metal is both critical and strategic with 60% import reliance; Germany is the largest importer (16.6% in 2024) (EU CRM 2023; UN Comtrade). |
| India | High | – | 6.7% | 0.7% | −$390.5 m | Yes | Produces about 59 kt of ferrosilicon but no silicon metal, and imports 5.2% of world silicon metal and 8.5% of ferrosilicon by value; silicon is on India's 2023 critical list (USGS; UN Comtrade 2024). |
| China | Low | – | 3.2% | 31.2% | +$1.64 bn | No | Makes almost 80% of world silicon materials (7,500 kt Si content in 2025) and is the largest exporter of silicon metal (38.3%) and ferrosilicon (21%) (USGS; UN Comtrade 2024). |
| Japan | High | – | 14.6% | 0.2% | −$930.0 m | Yes | Largest ferrosilicon importer (19.1%) and a major silicon metal importer (11.0%) in 2024, feeding steel, silicones and wafer production (UN Comtrade). |
| Latin America | Low | – | 2.7% | 13.5% | +$620.1 m | no list | Brazil produced 180 kt of silicon metal and 170 kt of ferrosilicon in 2025 and exported 13.4% of world silicon metal in 2024 (USGS; UN Comtrade). |
| Middle East | High | – | 2.2% | 0.3% | −$121.2 m | no list | No Gulf producer appears in the USGS table; Turkey took 4.6% of world ferrosilicon imports in 2024 (UN Comtrade). |
| Australia | Low | – | 0.1% | 1.8% | +$97.9 m | Yes | Produced about 47 kt of silicon metal in 2025 and exported 3.1% of world silicon metal in 2024 (USGS; UN Comtrade). |
Silicon metal is critical and strategic for the EU (supply risk 1.3, economic importance 4.9, import reliance 60%), is on India's 2023 list, and was added to the US list in 2025. The risk is not geology but processing: China makes almost 80% of supply, largely with coal power (Conway, pdf p. 84), and recycling is nil. Substitutes are partial. Aluminium, silicon carbide and silicomanganese can replace ferrosilicon in some uses, while gallium arsenide and germanium substitute only in some semiconductor and infrared roles. Hayes and McCullough find the share of studies rating silicon critical fell from 42% to 20% as supplies grew (pdf p. 7).
EU 2023 Critical also a strategic raw material US 2025 list Yes India 2023 list YesEU 2023 assessment
Chart: EU 2023 criticality: supply risk against economic importance
Each dot is a material assessed by the EU in 2023. The shaded corner is the critical zone (supply risk ≥ 1.0, economic importance ≥ 2.8). Silicon: supply risk 1.3, economic importance 4.9. EU import reliance, processing 60% EU recycling input rate 0%Substitutes
Aluminium, silicon carbide and silicomanganese for ferrosilicon in some uses; gallium arsenide and germanium in semiconductors and infrared