Rare earths: Criticality
On every major critical list in the world
What this tab covers How exposed economies are to a supply disruption: the EU, US and India listings, the concentration score, and a quantified exposure for the US, EU, India, China, Japan, Latin America, the Middle East and Australia. Where the EU scored it, a chart of supply risk against economic importance, with import reliance, recycling input and substitutes.Exposure by region
| Region | Exposure | Share of world output | Share of world imports | Share of world exports | Net trade (US$) | On own critical list | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | Low | 11.4% | 7.4% | 17.0% | +$88.9 m | Yes | Mined 51,000 t REO in 2025 and exports concentrate, but relied on imports for 67% of compounds and metals, mostly from China, and is building separation and magnet capacity with Defense loans and a $110/kg NdPr floor (USGS 2026; MP 2025). |
| EU | High | 0.0% | 7.7% | 10.8% | −$12.2 m | Yes | Has no meaningful mine output, lists light and heavy rare earths as critical and strategic, and depends on imports for 80-100% of supply with a 1% recycling input rate (EU CRM 2023). |
| India | Low | 0.6% | 0.6% | 2.5% | +$25.1 m | Yes | Mines about 2,900 t REO a year through IREL, supplied 2.5% of world rare-earth compound export value in 2024, lists rare earths as critical (2023) and is subsidising 6,000 tpa of magnet capacity (USGS 2026; Comtrade; Cabinet 2025). |
| China | Medium | 67.8% | 60.5% | 25.7% | −$993.9 m | Yes | Mined 270,000 t REO in 2025 (69% of world), holds 44 Mt of reserves, imports intermediates for separation (60.5% of world import value in 2024) and controls exports through licences (USGS 2026; Comtrade). |
| Japan | High | 0.0% | 8.6% | 14.9% | +$30.6 m | Yes | Has no mines but is a large processor and magnet maker, with 14.9% of world rare-earth compound export value and 8.6% of imports in 2024, and has backed Lynas since the 2010 embargo (Comtrade; Pitron). |
| Latin America | Low | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.1% | −$7.01 m | no list | Brazil holds the second-largest reserves at 11 Mt REO, raised output from 560 t (2024) to 2,000 t (2025) from ionic clays, and received a $465 million US DFC loan for heavy rare earths (USGS 2026). |
| Middle East | Low | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | +$261k | no list | No rare-earth mine output is listed by USGS for the region in 2025. |
| Australia | Low | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | −$978k | Yes | Mined 29,000 t REO in 2025, holds 6.3 Mt of reserves and hosts Lynas, the largest separated-oxide producer outside China (USGS 2026; Lynas FY2025). |
Rare earths sit on every major list. The EU rates light rare earths critical and strategic, with supply risk 3.7 and economic importance 5.9. They are also on the US 2025 and India 2023 lists. The risk lies in processing more than in rock. China mines about two-thirds of output but dominates separation and magnets, and it has used export controls repeatedly. USGS says substitutes exist for many uses but are generally less effective. Deng Xiaoping's comparison of China's rare earths with Middle East oil signalled the strategic intent early (Scheyder, pdf p. 113).
EU 2023 Critical also a strategic raw material US 2025 list Yes India 2023 list Yes Production HHI 4,862 highly concentratedEU 2023 assessment
Chart: EU 2023 criticality: supply risk against economic importance
Each dot is a material assessed by the EU in 2023. The shaded corner is the critical zone (supply risk ≥ 1.0, economic importance ≥ 2.8). Rare earths: supply risk 3.7, economic importance 5.9. EU import reliance, extraction 80% EU import reliance, processing 100% EU recycling input rate 1% US net import reliance, 2025 67% share of apparent consumptionSubstitutes
Available for many applications but generally less effective